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2DEVELOPMENT OF REGIONAL LABOUR MARKETS UNDER ENTERPRISE
RESTRUCTURING PROCESS
T.Chetvernina (Head), I.Soboleva, S.Lomonosova
Stylised facts about the Rusian labour market
During the 1990-s in the process of market reorientation of the Russian economy the
employment situation has worsened considerably. The fact is manifested in the reduction of
economic activity rate; reduction of employment which amounted to 10 mln during the period
1991-1997, growth of the unemployment rate from 4,7% in 1992 to 9,1% in 1997, growth of
the average  unemployment duration as a result of the labour demand reduction.
Under these conditions the problem of estimating current and perspective labour de-
mand of Russian industrial enterprises is of great theoretical and practical interest.
As it is known, in Russia the prolonged decline of industrial output was not accompanied by
an adequate reduction in employment. During the first half of 1990-s industrial output de-
clined more than twofold versus only 25% reduction in employment. This allows to suggest a
hypothesis that Russian enterprises accumulate internal labour surplus. The hypothesis was
tested by several researches (Аукуционек С., Капелюшников Р., 1995; Виноградова Е.,
1996; Кабалина В., Козина И., Донова И., 1996; Московская А., 1997 ) analysing the la-
bour surplus structure and the reasons for its preserving.
Research on the tendencies of employment in Russia was also carried out by the Cen-
tre for Labour Market Studies RAS. According to the Russian Labour Flexibility Survey
(RLFS detailed characteristic of the survey is given below) from the beginning of 1990-s the
reduction of employment in Russian industry is observed. Each year the employment on the
panel enterprises reduced steadily by about 8%. Notwithstanding the fact that during the pe-
riod observed economic situation and dynamics of industrial production as well as the legisla-
tive base changed several times the employment dynamics remained stable1. We presume
there must be serious internal reasons for such enterprise and employees behaviour that must
be analysed more thoroughly.
One of the key instruments of the vast and elaborated theory of modelling enterprise
behaviour (including enterprise labour demand) is the mathematical apparatus of the produc-
tion function (Cobb-Douglas function). We applied this apparatus for building the model of
labour demand in the industry of Russia.
As it is known the nearer is the economic situation to a free competitive market being
in the state of long-term equilibrium the better are the conditions for model-building and
econometric estimation. State interference in the economy, cyclical, structural and financial
crises, monopolies exist practically in any contemporary society. Still the Cobb-Douglas appa-
ratus is widely applied for analysing microeconomics processes all over the world and eco-
nomics in transition are no exception.
Still in the case of Russia it is suitable to assess the extent to which the competitive
and equilibrium assumptions apply in the national economy.
                                                
1 For details see [8] (“The mechanism of internal adaptation...”, M.,1995 )
3I. The usual approach to economic modelling demands competitive environment,
placing a hard budget constraint and an effective constraint from the demand side on each
economic unit.
In a classical command economy which Russia was until the beginning of the 1990-s
the budget constraint ineffective. In the course of market reorientation the budget constraint
grew harder and the validity of the demand constraint increased. This was due to price and
trade liberalisation as well as privatisation and enterprise restructuring initiated by the market-
oriented members of the government. Between 1993 and 1996 about 14 thousand companies
were “privatised”. By 1995 about 70% of total production was accounted for by what could
loosely be called the “private sector”. This allows us to presume that by the middle of the dec-
ade market oriented economy system was established, albeit in  chaotic conditions and with
numerous distortions. This year Russia is bound to be recognised as a market economy by EU.
Mainly the less developed market economies were against granting Russia the market econ-
omy rights but they remained a minority. The position of those countries could be explained
by their fear to loose competitive advantage and not by objective evaluation of the economic
situation in Russia.
Still the budget constraint in Russia is not as hard as it could be at least for the fol-
lowing reasons:
1) Industrial monopolies. Because of the minor role given to de-monopolisation of the pro-
duction system on the first stages of  transition, with price liberalisation hyper-inflationary
pressures were unleashed. Partial price liberalisation in January 1992 generated an inflationary
process in which consumer and producer price rose by over 2500% in less than a year. So
profit maximisation was achieved to a large part by price growth and not by cost reduction.
The process was slowed only in 1996-1997 but not because competitive environment was
built. A barrier on inflation was erected by a freeze on prices by monopolistic industries plus a
further deflationary  “policy” of ents in Federal spending on social and cultural activities;
2) Weakness of tax and normative regulation. A highly complicated tax system together with
weak discipline of tax-paying produce a possibility not only for partial tax-evasion but even
for direct refuse to pay taxes. As compared to 1994 in 1995 tax debt grew 200% and
amounted to 57,4 trln roubles. By international standards the proportion of taxation that is
actually paid has been very low. The IMF estimated that the Russian authorities were collect-
ing taxes equivalent to about 9% of the  GDP.
3) There is system of government support of selected enterprises and branches of industry as
well as practice of selected regions, cities or sectors.
4) Widespread development of peculiar forms of credit and non-pecuniary exchange, the most
common of which are the following:
- non-payments which can be regarded as a form of forced tied credit. From 1992 in the Rus-
sian economy the process of growing indebtedness between enterprises which endangers eco-
nomic entities was generated. In 1995 as compared to 1994 in debtedness to suppliers in-
creased 120% and amounted to 122,3 trln roubles;
- barter, meaning direct or indirect exchange of commodities. Some experts share the view
that the problem of not-collecting taxes stems not from intentional concealing of income but
from the fact that the real price of goods bartered is 15-20% lower than it is started in the en-
terprise accounting books. The others are bound to think that “barter prices” are high than the
prices of the world market (see Karpov. Virtual  miracles of Russian economy - Expert, 1998,
N2, p.8);
4- quasi-monetary exchanges (dishonoured bills, etc.). In some branches of industry such as
energetic non-monetary payments amount to 90-95% of all sales.
- non-monetary payments bias the existing output statistics. Discount on arreared payments
sometimes is as big as 50% of reported output or sales. Therefore the reality may differ a great
deal from official statistics.
II. Among other economic assumptions frequently used when analysing labour mar-
kets is the assumption that firms behave rationally (in the neo-classical sense) and they are
aimed at profit maximisation. Of course, in Russia market reorientation has led to a  consider-
able change in the motives of enterprise management. Increased efficiency of the demand con-
straint became a barrier to output maximisation disregarding the costs of such strategy. The
motivation system of a Russian enterprise manager is usually very complicated but the strat-
egy or even tactics of survival usually is a key element in it. In the middle of the 1990-s it has
become evident that a majority of managers are usually motivated by short-term objectives
ignoring the long-term interests of production and thus hindering the efficiency growth. In
some cases they manage to receive considerable short-term profits exploiting the situation of
economic disorder, unstable property rights and weak legislation. The costs of their business
activities are usually born by society.
III. The econometric estimation of a relationship among several macroeconomic indi-
cators assumes a stable economic situation in the sense of long-term equilibrium. Otherwise
the Lucas critique applies and one has to check for the regime changes over time and possible
structural breaks in the relationship. Market reorientation of Russian economy took place un-
der an unprecedented decline of production and moderate production decline the “shock-
therapy” measures of 1992 led to a catastrophic fall of output.
Between 1989-1996 industrial output reduced more than twofold and a slight recovery
has been manifested only since the end of 1996. Yet the observed growth is incomparable
with the decline of the previous years.
The stated above characteristics of the economic situation in Russia cannot but place
restrictions on the applicability of traditional econometric analysis including Cobb-Douglas
function to the behaviour of Russian industrial enterprises. Therefore we thought it necessary
to complement the mathematical model with qualitative analysis of empirical information
collected when working on this project and  during several previous years. We hope this will
provide a more comprehensive outlook on the processes of labour demand generation in Rus-
sian industry.
Data and descriptive characteristics
This research is based upon socio-economic survey of industrial enterprises (Russian
Labour Flexibility Survey -- RLFS), conducted by the Centre of Labour Market Studies of the
Institute of Economics RAS since 1991. At that time the survey was initiated by ILO and
USSR Goskomstat (the researchers of the Centre being only co-executors). From 1993 the
survey was continued by ILO and the Centre and since 1996 it is conducted solely under the
initiative and with the might of the researchers of the Centre in close cooperation with socio-
economic centres of nine Russian regions.
The characteristic feature of our survey is not only its scale (monitoring conducted by
the Ministry of Labour covered not more than 150 enterprises and was never conducted on a
regular basis), but in richness and detailed character of information on labour and employment
received during the seven years crucial for the transition to market economy. Besides the sur-
5vey is a sort of enterprise monitoring (starting from 1991 for Moscow, Moscovskaya oblast
and St.Petersburg, from 1993 for Nizhegorodskaya and Ivanovskaya oblast, from 1995 for
Vladimirskaya oblast, etc.) since it is held every year one and the same month (June) and cov-
ers basically the same questions (though the questionnaire is a bit modified each year while
some pressing questions are included and the ones that lost their urgency are omitted) and the
same enterprise panel. In 1996 the survey covered 497 enterprises in * Russian Regions (Mos-
cow, Moskovskaya oblast, St.Petersburg, Nizhegorodskaya oblast, Ivanovskaya oblast,
Vladimirskaya oblast, Chelyabinskaya oblast, city of Naberezhnyie Chelny).
The survey results are not representative for the whole of Russia but are representative
for each of the regions surveyed. The regional sampling was carried out by economico-
statistical institutions of the regions concerned according to two criteria: the structure of re-
gional manufacturing industry and enterprise size.
The survey methodology was initially developed by ILO (by Dr.G.Standing person-
ally) and applied in 15 different countries including Eastern Europe and CIS (Ukraine, Kir-
giziya and Armenia). Only in Russia though the survey was held regularly year by year during
the 1990s. the survey methodology is based on the collection of economic information first of
all on labour and unemployment relations on the enterprise level (in enterprise departments
dealing with labour and wage, accounting, etc.) and from an extensive interview with enter-
prise Director or Deputy Director.
The first (economic) part of the questionnaire includes detailed questions on the eco-
nomic indicators of enterprise activity: number of employed by gender and professional cate-
gories (no statistical institution supplies such information), labour turnover by professional
category, vacancies, hiring and separations by gender and professional category, number of
hours worked, remuneration by professional category including tariff and bonus payments,
dividends. Questions on the enterprise expenditures on wages and salaries, training and re-
training and social sphere (if it exists) are also included.
The second part of the questionnaire (economico-sociological) includes estimates of
different aspects of the enterprise activity as well as such indicators as the rate of production
capacity usage, the share of non-tariff payments in the overall employee’s income, full and
partial production stoppages (weeks, wage arrears periods. The information supplied is veri-
fied by the enterprise Director (or his/her Deputy) in different enterprise administration de-
partments.
The second part of the questionnaire (interview with the Director) may be divided into
several blocks:
1. Economic situation of the enterprise: usage of production capacities, sources of invest-
ment, debts, main problems met by the enterprise during the current year, existence of social
sphere, its conditions and Director’s future plans concerning its development.
2. Personnel strategy of the management: hiring and firing preferences and priorities, exis-
tence of labour surplus and the reasons for keeping it, the management plans concerning pres-
ervation or changing the professional structure of employed if organisational changes occur,
introducing new technology, changing production profiles, etc.
3. Management’s reactions on continuing economic crisis: production stoppages, lay-offs,
inter-enterprise mobility of employees, wage and salary non-payments and arrears, etc.
4. The employment impact of technological innovations, changes in labour organisation
and in nomenclature produced.
5. The practised systems of employee remuneration.
6. The employer-employee relations (trade unions, collective agreements, strikes).
67. Practised by administration systems and forms of hiring by professional category.
8. System of employee training and retraining: training of new-hires, training with the aim
of labour productivity growth, training for improving remuneration and career prospects, re-
training preferences by gender and age.
Quality and reliability of the information received are provided by two main moments:
- Support of the enterprise managers with whom close and steady relations have been devel-
oped during several years of cooperation and to whom regular analytical information on the
survey results is supplied (including 1997).
- High qualification and experience of the interviewers conducting the field works. As our ex-
perience shows, the kind of survey we conduct can be carried out only by highly qualified
specialists in the field of economics and statistics aquainted with the labour economies, since
their consultation and explanations are frequently needed to ensure proper calculations of
certain indicators included in the questionnaire. One of the most complicated items is relative
remuneration of male and female labour. The help of the interviewers is also frequently
needed when filling the table on employment structure by age and gender. Wrongly or care-
lessly filled questionnaires are exposed right away or in the extreme case in the process of the
logical control. They are either not accepted at all or returned to the enterprise for correcting if
the faults could be easily dealt with. We are very particular as far as the selection and instruc-
tion of the interviewers in each region are concerned. (In St.Petersburg, for example, the in-
terviewer team was changed three times). The Head of each interviewer team is supplied with
a booklet containing detailed explanations concerning each item of the questionnaire. During
the survey period and while logical control is conducted we keep close phone contact with the
regional interviewer team Heads for operative control.
In Moscow and Moscovskaya oblast the field works are carried out by the researchers
of the Centre themselves.
In 1997, because of the lack of financing the survey was carried out on a very reduced
scale. The number of regions surveyed was cut down from 8 to 3 and the number of enter-
prises covered -- from 497 to 186 (the Project stipulated 180). Both parts of the questionnaire
were reduced and simplified.
The selection of regions (Moscow, Nizhegorodskaya oblast) was based upon the fol-
lowing considerations:
First, the regions selected differ by their current economic situation and potential. Moscow is
a well-to-do region with high economic potential. Nizhegorodskaya oblast is a region en-
counting many complicated problems but its economic potential is also high. And Ivanov-
skaya oblast is undoubtedly one of the most depressed regions of Russia.
The integrational differences outlined above are supported by such integrative indica-
tors as regional GDP per capita and the rate of industrial output reduction. According to the
Goscomstat data on GDP per capita for 1995, Moscow occupied one of the top positions
(177%), Nizhegorodskaya oblast was somewhere in the middle of the scale (99%) and Iva-
novskaya oblast was twice beneath the average indicator for Russia (53%)2. As regards indus-
trial production reduction rate during 1992-1995 the three regions selects also fell into differ-
ent categories (although in each of them the reduction has taken place). In Moscow the reduc-
                                                
2 The average indicator for Russia is taken for 100%.
7tion was relatively small, in Nizhegorodskaya oblast -- “about average”, in Ivanovskaya oblast
-- “deep”3.
Second, in Ivanovskaya oblast the survey was initially carried out by the Centre. Therefore the
Centre is in full and unrestricted possession of the data received during the previous years (on
condition of informing the author of the methodology -- Dr.G.Standing).
Third, the interviewer teams of Ivanovo and Nizhniy Novgorod are the most highly qualified,
industrious and reliable ones, which ensures quick and high quality filling of the question-
naires. Good quality of questionnaire filling which resulted in smooth and easy data process-
ing made it possible to process all the data during a minimum time period -- one month after
the field works were completed.
Fourth, transport and accommodation costs were minimised. For example, surveying Chely-
abinsk area would require twice as high transport expenditures as the two selected regions
taken together and accommodation costs in St.Petersburg are at least as high as in each of the
regions selected.
Fifth, while selecting the regions we took into account the Expert council recommendation to
make the fullest usage possible of the data already obtained in previous years. The sample of
enterprises in each region was chosen in accordance with regional industry structure and so as
to include as many enterprises surveyed since 1992 as possible.
Quality of the Sample of 180 Enterprises, Included in the Survey of 1997.
The process of transition of Russian (post-Soviet) planned economy to a market economy had
a serious impact on the sample structure. The changes can be summarised as follows:
First, much property form restructuring took place during 1992-1995 period. The most inten-
sive restructuring of state-owned enterprises occurred before 1994. In 1994-1996, the rate of
privatisation slowed down, but the number of new non-state enterprises was rapidly increas-
ing. As our analysis shows, the property form change has little or no impact on enterprise eco-
nomic indicators.
Second, new enterprises created after 1991 were included in the sample. In 1995, the sample
share of such enterprises was 12.6%, in 1996 -- 11.7%. In 1997 it went down to 3.8% since
the preference in the process of enterprise selection was given to those already surveyed. The
number of employed on the new enterprises is substantially lower than on the old ones. There-
fore inclusion of a large number of new enterprises biases the sample in the direction of low-
ering the average size of industrial employment in the region.
Third, in some cases merging of enterprises or separations of production units from enter-
prises surveyed occurred. In previous years, the questionnaires used to include blocks of
questions concerning the impact of mergings and separations on the size of employment. Each
case was considered separately. If some firm was divided into separate units (which was a
very rare case) monitoring was carried out in one of them. If a firm “swallowed” some smaller
structures it used to be surveyed further on. If some firm was “swallowed” by a more powerful
structure, monitoring used to be stopped, but the latter structure was included in the sample as
a new enterprise.
                                                
3 The classification of Russian regions by the depth of industrial reduction was carried out by Expert Institute
(Russia) and Russian and East European Centre of Birmingham University (UK). See “Voprosy Ekonomiki”,
1996, No6.
8Fourth, some of the enterprises were excluded from the sample either because they failed to
survive in the new market environment and were obliged to close, or because they refused to
cooperate. In order to maintain the quality of the sample such enterprises were substituted
with similar ones as far as industry branch and the number of employed were concerned.
Main Sample Characteristics.
The survey (field works) was conducted in June, 1997, on 186 industrial enterprises of three
Russian economic regions: Moscow, Nizhegorodskaya oblast and Ivanovskaya oblast.
The sample consists mostly of enterprises that were surveyed at least during the last 3 years.
154 enterprises (82.8%) are surveyed at least since 1994 that is for 4 subsequent years.
The Field works were Carried Out:
In Moscow -- by the researchers of the Centre (including the Project participants).
In Nizhegorodskaya oblast -- by economists and sociologists of the Institute of Sociology
RAS.
In Ivanovskaya oblast -- by economists of the research group of Ivanovo Technological Insti-
tute.
In the sample enterprises of different industry branches, property forms and employment size
are represented. The general idea of it can be obtained from the data represented in the fol-
lowing table.
Table 1.
Sectors’ distribution of the surveyed enterprises, 1997, (number).
Branch Moscow Nizhegorodskaya
oblast
Ivanovskaya
oblast
Total
engineering 34 23 10 67
food processing 6 18 6 30
light 12 7 18 37
chemical 7 6 3 16
wood processing 4 6 10 20
construction materials 6 7 3 16
Total 69* 67** 50*** 186
*68 of them are being surveyed since 1994
**64 of them are being surveyed since 1994
***22 of them are being surveyed since 1994
What we mean is state ownership, large scale, high labour intensity and routine tech-
nology. During the first years of transition the highest priority was given  to privatisation
which  according to the reformers was bound  to result in appearance of a real owner. The
newly generated market forces were expected to stimulate this real owner towards changing
9economic priorities, investing in innovative technologies and reorganising labour relations. If
so, enterprise restructuring followed by the growth of labour  productivity, efficiency and
competitiveness will be a natural consequence of privatisation. Under the circumstances tech-
nological modernisation and employment reduction would become inevitable. The second ar-
gument supporting quick voucher privatisation was that supplying each employee with a share
of property would make all of them co-owners of enterprises interested in raising production
efficiency. Below we shall attempt to show the directions in which the economic behaviour of
the new owners has been changing and the impact of those changes on the economic condi-
tions of enterprises and employees.
Now after seven years of reforms it can be said that two of the objectives declared
breaking gigantic enterprises into smaller units and their privatisation were to a certain extent
achieved. This is supported by the data of the industrial enterprise survey conducted by our
Centre.
Privatisation and its Consequences.
The first stage of privatisation was practically over by 1994. The state monopoly in
industry was overcome. From 1995 the process of reorganisation of state enterprises has
showed down but another process - the process of creation of new small-scale private enter-
prises has been gaining force.
The methods of property reorganisation in manufacturing industry have been gradually
changing too. During the first three years of reforms the most popular property form was
closed-stock company with a significant proportion of shares belonging to workers (72.6%).
Since the end of 1994 open-stock companies begin to prevail. Many of newly-established
closed-stock companies undergo a second reorganisation into open-stock companies in the
course of which the proportion of shares belonging to workers decreases. Since 1996 the pro-
portion of closed-stock companies decreased while the proportion of open-stock companies
continues to grow.
Table 5.
Index of the proportion of state, closed-stock and open-stock companies in manufactur-
ing between 1994 and 1997 (the proportion in 1994 is assumed to be 100).  N=153
property form in % to the previous
year
1994 1995 1996 1997 1995 1996 1997
state 100 75,7 70,3 62,2 75,7 92,9 88,5
open JS 100 122 125 132 122 103 105
closed JS 100 111 107 104 111 97 97
It is evident that the dynamics steps from the changing proportion of co-owners in the
property structure of privatised enterprises. It is worth noting that while the proportion of
workers-shareholders both in on open-stock closed-stock companies has been reducing (see
Table 6), its redistribution was going differently. In open-stock enterprises the shares were
actively redistributed in favour of the administration. While in closed-stock enterprises the
proportion of shares belonging to the administration has increased from 22.9% in 1994 to
42.2% in 1997 (that is less then twofold), in open-stock enterprises it has increased more then
5 times and reached 23.5% in 1997. In closed-stock enterprises  external shareholders ap-
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peared. Their proportion reached 8.3% in 1997. In open-stock companies the proportion of
external shareholders has not changed.
Table 6.
Dynamics of the proportion of shares belonging to workers in 1994-1997 (%). N=153.
shares belong to workers 1994 1995 1996 1997
opened JS 51,8 51,2 36,9 34,7
closed JS 72,6 58,7 53,5 49,6
It can be seen that the property structure has undergone considerable changes as compared to
1994. On the closed-stock companies the property distribution between workers and admini-
stration has equalised. In open-stock enterprises the bulk of property has changed hands be-
tween workers, external shareholders and administration in favour of the latter. If this process
continues with the same rate the workers would loose the rest of their shares in two years
while the shares would be equally distributed between the administration and external share-
holders.
The facts stated above enable us to conclude that the process of property reorganisa-
tion is not over yet. While the majority of closed-stock enterprises are bound to get a single
owner - administration - in the nearest future, it is not yet clear whether the administration or
the external share holders will become the real owners of the open-stock enterprises.
The process of property form restructuring is closely linked to the economic situation
of enterprises. We have analysed the economic indicators of several property categories of
enterprises. Firstly, all enterprises were grouped by property form (state, closed-stock, open-
stock). The last two categories were grouped by the proportion of shares belonging to workers.
as a result 6 categories of enterprises were formed: I - state, II - closed-stock with workers
share less than 50%, III - closed-stock with workers share more than 50%, IV - open-stock
with workers share less than 25%, V - open-stock with workers share between 25% and 50%,
VI - open-stock with workers share more than 50%. The proportion of each group in the total
number of enterprises surveyed was 18%, 12%, 10%, 21%, 27% and 12% correspondingly.
Our research has demonstrated that open-stock companies workers share more than
51% are the most successful group.
In 1994 the state enterprises had the best indicators, which is natural taking into ac-
count that at that moment all the other categories of enterprises experienced difficulties of re-
structurisation and were in search of markets. Later sales were growing faster in the non-state
sector as a result of regaining connections with customers. In 1996 open-stock companies with
workers share more than 51% regained positions and in 1997 demonstrated better perform-
ance than state enterprises.
Similar picture is seen when comparing the rate of production capacity utilisation. The
biggest decline of the utilisation rate (17%) was experienced by closed-stock companies with
workers share less than 50% and by open-stock enterprises with workers share less than 25%.
Those categories of enterprises demonstrated the lowest rate of capacity utilisation (27% and
30% correspondingly). The highest rate of capacity utilisation was achieved by open-stock
companies with workers share more than 50%. State enterprises, closed-stock companies with
workers share more than 50% and open-stock  companies with workers share between 25%
and 50% demonstrated average results.
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Table 7.
Some economic indicators of enterprises grouped by property form and by proportion
of shares belonging to workers.
I II III IV V VI
capacity utilisation
1995
1996
1997
63,1
53,8
50,7
51,3
45,6
33,5
52,9
50,2
41,8
47,4
39,5
30,0
51,0
42,7
41,6
56,9
61,5
54,6
increased output:
1994
1995
1997
24,3
32,1
34,8
-
11,1
10,0
8,3
21,1
23,1
7,7
21,4
39,3
4,3
20,0
11,1
14,8
34,5
40,0
decreased output:
1994
1995
1996
54,1
21,4
43,5
100
55,6
60,0
83,4
52,6
61,5
92,3
64,3
50,0
78,3
63,3
61,1
70,4
44,8
40,0
implemented new technology
1994
1995
1997
35,1
25,0
17,4
33,3
22,2
20,0
41,7
47,4
38,5
38,5
42,9
21,4
52,2
43,3
27,8
44,8
37,9
53,3
The dynamics of employment on different categories of enterprises is represented in
Table 8.
Table 8.
Employment changes in the enterprises different property forms
state closed JS opened JS
Shares belonged to workers, %
Employment changes <
25%
25-
50%
>
51%
< 25% 25-
50%
>
51%
1994/93 -5,1 * * -6,0 -15,5 -3,6 -10,7
1995/94 -9,0 * -15,9 -11,5 +2,0 -6,8 -7,8
1996/95 -8,3 -20,7 -13,2 -11,6 -13,8 -12,9 +2,5
1997/96 -9,4 * -18,0 -11,2 -16,6 -15,3 +1,2
As is shown in the table the only category having experienced positive changes is
open-stock companies with workers share more than 50%. And the most severe employment
decline was experienced by closed-stock with workers share less than 50%.
So far two tendencies can be traced: economic indicators are the better 1) the more is
the proportion of shares belonging to workers; 2) the more consistent the process of property
restructurisation is. The relatively more satisfactory performance of state enterprises in some
cases may be explained by their more favourable starting positions.
There were two directions in employment declining. First one - reducing of the num-
ber of employees and breaking up into smaller units. Second - Formation of the new small
enterprises. During 1993-1997 the cumulitive effect brought to increasing of the share of the
small enterprises more than three times and decreasing twice the share of big enterprises (with
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1000 employees and more). In Moscow and Nijnii Novgorod this process was more distinct.
(See Table 9 and Diagram 1).
Table 9.
Distribution of the enterprises by employment size, 1993-1997 , %
employment size 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
less 100 people 7,8 11,8 15,0 20,5 25,5
100-250 24,2 22,9 24,8 25,2 22,9
251-500 30,7 31,4 31,4 26,5 27,5
501-1000 17,0 17,6 13,1 13,2 11,8
more 1000 people 20,3 16,3 15,7 14,6 12,4
Diagram 1.
Shares of enterprises with number of employed less than 1000 people in Moscow and
N.Novgorod oblast in 1993-1997,%
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Working out employment policy .  From the beginning of market reorientation of the econ-
omy enterprise employment policy was influenced by changes in social and economic situa-
tion. The first stage in linked to institutional reorganisation of 1991-1993. The change of po-
litical priorities of the last half of 1991 generated the price liberalisation of 1992, which was
severally opposed by the majority of enterprise managers. At the time employment policy was
one of the last concerns.
During the second stage (1993-94) the main concern of the managers was privatisation
and property division. The only aspect of employment policy that mattered to them was very
pragmatic: how to make the employees to divide enterprise property to management`s advan-
tage. It was a period of equitable property distribution and democratic innovations in the
charters of newly established corporations.
During the first two stages employment reduced steadily about 8% per year.
1994/95 became a turning point for enterprise employment policy. Firstly, with ac-
complishment of the first stage of privatisation the management`s position was strengthened
and enterprise directors acquired a new status. Secondly, the ban on mass releases of redun-
dant personnel was lifted. Thirdly, it became clear to many directors that simply cutting down
the employment could not raise production efficiency if not accompanied by structural reor-
ganisation, changing the nomenclature and enforcing market competitiveness.
In 1995 the managers started to plan the employment size taking into account the sales
possibilities, which became the most acute problem for the majority of enterprises. The im-
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portant difference between having consumers and having solvent consumers began to emerge.
The problem of non-payments became the crucial point influencing the management`s
evaluation not only of employment perspectives for survival of their enterprises as well.
Change of employment . Not withstanding the declared by enterprise directors lack of interest
to employment problems, a pronounced employment policy linking reduction of employment
to reduction of output and the rate of production capacities usage. According to our survey
data, between 1993 and 1997 the rate of production capacity usage fell about 40% while em-
ployment fell 31,4% (see diagram 2). If before 1995 the average annual reduction in employ-
ment was about 8% in the late 1990s it amounted to 10,8% in 1995/96, 10,4% in 1996/97.
Diagram 2.
Average number of employed at the enterprises in 1993-1997. (according to the data of the
panel of 154 enterprises, surveyed in 1994-1997), people.*
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*By the whole range of enterprises surveyed in 1997 (186 enterprise) the average number of
employed amounted to 606 people.
Manpower releases.  The decline of output and worsening of economic conditions of
the enterprises influenced the structure of employees made redundant and the reasons for
separations. From the beginning of reforms forecasting redundancies and large-scale unem-
ployment in the nearest future became a common saying. But years passed and no mass re-
dundancies happened. As it was in the old times the main reason for separations was “ the
own will” of voluntary quit was always not less than 60% which is very high according to in-
ternational standards. The proportion of redundancies was 4 and  sometimes even 10 times
less. Still the “quality” of voluntary quit during the transition period has changed considera-
bly.
1991 - The voluntary quits were really voluntary and not only stated as such on paper. The
main reason was finding a new higher paid and/or higher status job in the new sectors of
economy: cooperatives and later small private enterprises. The job offered by those sectors
were not only higher paid but gave better opportunities to realise aptitudes and aspirations of
many ambitious workers. It was the highly qualified core personnel who quitted. According to
the enterprise directors the reasons for quits were distributed as follows: ”higher panty on the
new job” - 69,5%, “moving to another economic sector, to start one’s own business” - 9,8%,
14
“unsatisfactory work conditions” - 6%. Enterprise management usually took some pains to
keep qualified employees such as raising salaries and wages (73,6% of questioned directors)
or offering various benefits including improvement of living conditions.
1992-1993 - the start of privatisation. Stimulated by the growth of “work interruptions” which
soon grew into “forced stoppages” of production full or partial, enterprise management began
actively pushing employees who had reached 55-60 years of age to “voluntary retirement”
promising increases to their pensions or significant severance payments. The efforts to stop
qualified personnel quits become less pronounced. Gradually administrative leave comes into
being though the management usually pays compensation amounting to average wage. During
the period the rate of release of redundant workers is the highest - 13,7%.
1994-1995. The paid administrative leave becomes widespread and sometimes unpaid leave is
practised. Voluntary quits are gradually replaced by separations forced by non-payment of
wages and salaries, frequent production stoppages, diminishing job security. The proportion of
such  pseudo-voluntary quits is growing while the proportion of open releases of redundant
employees is diminishing (see table 10 )
1996-1997. Enterprise administration actively stimulates pseudo-voluntary quits. While the
group of rather more well-to-do enterprises practices both ways of cutting employment (open
releases and pseudo-voluntary quits) the group of their less lucky counterparts having no fi-
nancial resources to repay the arreared wages to say nothing of severance payments just waits
for the despaired employees to quit “on their own will”.
So, the rather low rate of releasing redundant employees in the mid 90`s was fully
compensated by pseudo-voluntary quits. The fact is certainly worth noting when evaluating
the Ministry of Labour proposal not to pay any unemployment benefit to those unemployed
who left their enterprises “on their own will” as it is practised in some countries. The peculi-
arity of Russian situation as opposed to common practice of other countries when “voluntary”
separation are in fact included by severe employment conditions in consciously ignored.
Table 10.
The structure of separations, by reasons in 1994-1997.          N=153
Reasons 1994 1995 1996 1997
“own will” 63,0 63,5 61,6 59,1
retirement 13,8 14,3 18,6 17,1
firing because of discipline violation 5,3 4,6 6,3 4,3
redundancy releases 6,9 5,7 14,2 10,5
Changes in professional structure of employees4.
During 1990-s employment restructuring took place upon the following directions.
Decline of the proportion of qualified workers in the total employment. The rate of reduction
of employment of qualified workers was the highest after 1994. Notwithstanding the fact that
formally qualified workers quitted enterprises “on their own will”, as a role those were
pseudo-voluntary separations induced by either non-payment of wages or very small size of
                                                
4 This part of the paper is based on researches done by A.Moskovskaya on the bases of survey of industrial
enterprises 1991-1997. The full version is presented in report “Changing in professional structure of personnel of
industrial enterprises”/
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remuneration incomparable not only to descend consumer standards but even to the regional
living wage. Nevertheless even during the late 1990-s rate of separations for qualified workers
was not very high and the reduction of proportion of this category in the total employment was
not drastic. The phenomenon may be explained by the growing tenseness of regional labour
markets coupled with a lack of possibilities for intra-regional and inter-regional migration be-
cause of high cost of accommodation (housing) and transport.
For the majority of workers fear of loosing their job co-exist with the fear of not find-
ing a new one in the district or city where they belong. Therefore workers usually prefer ad-
ministrative leave or involuntary part-timing and many-month wait for arreared wages while
keeping the links to their enterprise and the employed status to open unemployment/ If the
Russian labour market were as flexible as it is perceived by many of officials lots of those suf-
fering from unfavourable employment conditions would prefer to quit and the proportion of
qualified workers on surveyed enterprises would have declined much more drastically.
The policy of management aimed at keeping qualified personnel when it is possible
has also contributed to restraining the rate of separations for this category. The reasons under
such policy is that with disappearance of qualified stuff the industry profile of enterprise may
be lost and the changes for survival may be lost with it. So the management has strong mo-
tives for keeping such workers in spite of the fact they are currently idle. Two thirds of enter-
prises surveyed admitted to have a labour surplus.
Increase of the proportion of low-qualified workers.  The dynamics of employment of unquali-
fied workers is not linked to the dynamics of production as that of qualified. For instance,
output decline may not lead to reduction of demand for unqualified labour if the enterprise
increases barter operations and delivery services. Establishing departments for sailing the
goods produced in order to obtain real money may also increase the demand for unqualified
labour/ As unqualified workers have no specialised human capital they have no incentives to
hold to internal labour market of any particular enterprise, their intra-regional mobility is
comparably high - 33 percent of all unqualified workers changed jobs annually, while only 16
percent of qualified ones do so.
Growing proportion of administrative stuff. There may be two reasons to explain such proc-
ess: simple bureaucratisation of management and establishment of new managing units having
clearly defined functions to solve the problems posed by the changed economic situation. For
example, some successful enterprises have organised marketing departments and invited pro-
fessionals in the field to work there. The retraining of their own managerial stuff was more
expansive. In the most cases however organisation of departments bearing the same name is
no more than reorganisation or better say renaming and enlarging of existing sales department
when employees from other departments of the enterprise are transferred there without any
retraining just save the cost of inevitable otherwise separations.
Table 11.
The proportion of some professional categories in total employment in 
1991,1994,1996, in percent
Professional category 1991 1994 1996
managerial 12,1 15,5 15,6
qualified workers 64,1 63,6 61,8
unqualified workers 15,2 12,1 13,1
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On the basis of the survey data to opposite models of enterprise employment policy
can be distinguished. The first behaviour model  is typical for enterprises with steadily de-
clining total employment. Those enterprises have reoriented their main efforts from the pro-
duction sphere to the sphere of sales and services provision. Such strategy leads to dealing
proportion of core production workers and increasing proportion of administrative employees.
The second model is applied by enterprises where total employment has increased. The prior-
ity is given to raising production efficiency through technical and technological improvement.
Such strategy leads to declining proportion of both administrative employees and unqualified
workers.
Each model has its positive and negative aspects. On the one hand, reorientation of
professional structure from production workers to managing and service personnel (including
unqualified workers usually not involved in basic production activities) may in principle lead
to stabilisation of enterprise economic conditions favourable for generating production growth
and return of qualified personnel. Still another alternative is simple profit redistribution to the
advantage of the top enterprise management accompanied by dequalification and quits of core
qualified workers. On the other hand giving priority to production efficiency may bring possi-
ble results only on condition of favourable economic situation generating demand for enter-
prise products. If it is not so sales crisis followed by output and employment decline is inevi-
table.
Payment for Labour Policy
Current decade had the following tendencies in the field of payment for labour.
The decrease of the State influence on the process of formation of the payment for la-
bour. The evidence of that is, in the first instance, the repudiation to use the fixed tariff sys-
tem. In 1996, just 23.5% of the enterprises used tariff system to calculate the wages of their
employees (in 1995 — 46%, in 1994 — 56% of the enterprises), 43.9% used tariff system just
as guidelines for the calculation of wages of different categories of employees. At one third of
the enterprises, directors developed their own system of payment for labour, giving up the tar-
iff system. The significance of such State index as minimum wage has declined as well. The
State minimum wage index is a basis for the system of payment for labour at just 32% of the
enterprises.
The increase of the branch differentiation in the level of payment for labour. Light industry
was traditionally a low-wage branch. The lingering crises in this industry has led to
“chronically low” wages. The wages of the workers are two times less than the wages of the
workers in food processing industry, the leading industry by the level of payment for labour.
The following data testify to the stability of the tendencies. Since 1994 till 1997 the wages in
engineering and construction materials industry were average by the industry. Wages in light
industry were significantly lower (about 0.7 of the average by the industry), wages in food
processing industry — significantly higher (1.3 times higher than the average). Significant
changes in the level of payment for took place only in chemical industry — in 1994 wages
equalled 0.9 of the average wage, but due to the higher rate of growth, the payment for labour
in chemical industry amounted to 1.16 of the average wage by industry by the year of 1997.
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Diagram 3.
Branch differentiation of the payment for labour.
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
May, 1994 May, 1996 May, 1997
Engineering Food process. Light Wood
process.
Chemical Constr. mat. Average
Interregional differentiation in the level of payment for labour. Process of the differentiation
in payment for labour depends greatly on the typology of the selected regions. “Prosperity” of
the Moscow region is stipulated by the status of the capital and dynamically developing labour
market. Relative “wealth” of the Nijegorodskii region can be explained by the fact that vast
investment opportunities and “specific” attention of the politicians since the market reforms
started, is levelled to a great extent by the big share of the enterprises of the defence industry,
that belong to the State, with all the problems, inherent for this branch (lack of State orders,
idle time, problems in payment of wages, drain of qualified specialists, etc.). Steady
“depression” of Ivanovo region, that is based on the multi-branch peculiarities of the region, is
worsened by the region’s orientation not on the inner points of the growth of the economics,
but on the traditional subsidies from the Centre.
According to the data of our survey, the wage of the industrial employees in Moscow
amounted to 1099.2 thousand roubles (including bonuses and benefits) by the May, 1997; in
Nijegorodskii region — 993.7 thousand roubles; in Ivanovo region — 494 thousand roubles.
Tendencies in the field of payment for labour differ in different regions and can be explained
by the fact that Moscow, Nijegorodskii and Ivanovo regions belong to different types of re-
gions. During the whole period of survey Moscow was a prosperous region and had the high-
est wages during the years of 1994-97. Big potential and “specific” attention to the economic
problems of Nijnii Novgorod made the level of payment for labour close to the level of Mos-
cow industry. Thus, if the gap between the wages of the employees of Nijegorodskii industry
and Moscow industry was equal 1,41 times in May, 1994, it became 1.1 times by May, 1997.
At the same time, depression in Ivanovo, that became chronic, leads to the opposite tenden-
cies. While comparing the wages in Moscow and Ivanovo industries during the period of
1994-1997, the excess of the level of payment for labour in industry of Moscow region has
increased from 1.81 to 2.23 times. The situation is worsening each year, as, along with the dif-
ferentiation of the absolute levels of wages, the rate of wage growth differ as well. The rate of
growth of the nominal payment for labour in Ivanovo, for example, is 2 times (and more)
lower than in Nijegorodskii region and Moscow.
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Diagram 4. Payment for labour non-surveyed regions, thousand roubles.
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Decline of the share of payment for labour in the product cost.
During the 90s, tendencies if the change of the share of payment for labour in the
product cost had multi-trend character. 1994/95 became the border point of these changes.
During the first half of 90s, the share of the payment for labour was increasing, starting 1995
it started sinking in all branches with no exception. The popular way is to look for the reasons
for that in different fields.
The decrease of the share of labour costs in the product cost at one group of enterprises
is linked to the substitution of labour by other production factors. If this process deals with the
technological shifts or upgrade of equipment and means of labour, the substitution of labour
by production factors has a positive character. If there’s a “forced” substitution of labour,
caused by the unjustified rise in the cost of other production factors — materials, power, utili-
ties costs — then this process has negative traits. According to our data, more than half of the
enterprises that introduced technological novelties (56%), brought down the share of payment
for labour in other costs (for the rest of the enterprises this number was equal 40%)
Nevertheless, the broadening practice of not-paid labour became one of the main fac-
tors of reduction of labour costs, as the wage arrears do not suggest further indexation of the
non-paid amounts. The data shows that only 4 enterprises of 186 surveyed in 1997 indexed the
wages; in 1996 there were even less enterprises that had that practice.
The data also shows the qualitative worsening of the situation in this field. In spite the
fact that the share of the enterprises that practised wage arrears has not changed in comparison
with 1996 (though it equalled to 50%), the average period of arrears increased from 8 to 11
weeks.
Table 12.
Change of the share of payment for labour in the product cost, by branches, 1992-97.
Branch of Industry 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Engineering 24,1 27,0 28,7 26,6 25,9
Food processing 11,9 13,0 14,1 13,5 12,1
Light 19,7 24,3 25,5 26,4 24,6
Chemical 16,3 22,1 23,4 22,8 17,1
Wood processing 28,7 31,2 29,1 28,2 24,5
Construction materials 17,4 21,9 22,3 19,4 19,6
Average 20,3 23,5 24,6 23,5 21,7
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Broadening of the practice of use of flexible forms of payment for labour. It is known that in
many countries the practice of structural changes, that caused sharp cut back of production,
was accompanied by the broad use of flexible systems of remuneration for labour, aimed at
the reduction of labour costs and stimulation of the labour production growth.
In Russian processing industry the situation is not that simple and differs by the aspect
of time, that had its edge at 1995. During the first half of the 90s, the main trend was to reduce
the share of the tariff part and to broaden the use of the flexible forms, first of all — bonus
payments. There was a correlation between the indices of the economic activities of the enter-
prise and the share of the permanent part in the structure of the payment for labour. The better
were the indices of the activities of the enterprise (utilisation ratio, lack of idle periods, in-
crease in employment), the lower was the share of the tariff part in the payment for labour.
With the average share of the tariff part as 70% (by all enterprises), the least value of this in-
dex was observed at the enterprises of prosperous food industry and relatively prosperous fer-
rous metal industry (57.2% and 64% respectively). In the “crisis” light industry the share of
the tariff part equalled to 77.1%.
The situation started changing in 1995. First, the share of the permanent part of pay-
ment for labour increased (68.2% in 1994 to 76% in 1997) and the share of bonuses decreased
(23% in 1994 to 20% in 1997). Second, the increase of the share of tariff was of an uneven
character in the part of payment for labour for different qualificational groups: most rapid
growth was in the group of directors (64% in 1994 to 77% in 1997), least growth was in the
group of qualified workers (66% in 1994 to 72% in 1997). Probably, it was caused by the in-
creasing crises of non-payments, wage arrears and increase if the share of barter in enterprises’
settlements, that was the reason for the wages to become “natural”. Under the conditions of
the “deficit” of wage resources, it is natural that the management is trying to reduce bonus
payments in the first instance. This can also explain the wish (and, what is more important, the
way) of the management to include as much “live” money in the wages as possible, that will
help to “insure” the wages from non-money payments.
The other major peculiarity of the second half of 90s was the reduction of the share of
benefits in the total income if the employees of the enterprises — 8% in 1994 to 3% in 1997.
It is known that benefits were traditionally a measure for levelling of the incomes and support
of the categories of employees with low wages. Besides that, till 1996, benefits were not a
subject for taxation, that’s why they were widely used by the enterprises. That’s why, since
that time, reduction of the share of benefits, provided to the employees, is observed (in the
first instance it influenced additional forms of social insurance, practised before, meal subsi-
dies, etc.).
As far as the payment of dividends is concerned, they were not paid regularly and
made an insignificant value in the structure of the total income. But by the year of 1997 the
share of these payments was levelled by the categories of staff — 1.5% for directors and
qualified workers (2.6% and 2.4% respectively in 1994) and 1% for non-qualified workers
(2.6% in 1994).
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Diagram 5.
Structure of the total income in May, 1994 and 1997, in %.
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The increase of the internal differentiation in the payment for labour at the enterprise that re-
sulted in (1) increasing outstripping of the wages of managers in comparison with the wages
of qualified workers, (2) relatively stable correlation between the wages of qualified and non-
qualified workers and (3) “underestimation” of the specialists of the higher and middle level,
as their wages are just a bit higher than the wages of qualified workers and are lagging behind
significantly from the salaries of even the managers of the middle level (see Table 13). As the
result of the economic crisis, the economic relations between the level of qualification, quality
of labour and level of wages were destroyed.
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Table 13.
Correlation of the wages of different qualificatonal groups of employees in 1994-1997.
(Average wage of the qualified worker = 100). N=153.
Qualificational groups correlation of the correspond-
ing category with the average
wage of the qualified worker,
%
Managers
1994
1995
1996
1997
188
182
204
221
Specialists in administration
1994
1995
1996
1997
107
109
110
119
Middle level managers
1994
1995
1996
1997
142
140
148
152
Middle level specialists
1994
1995
1996
1997
107
109
101
110
non-qualified workers
1994
1995
1996
1997
53
52
55
54
In the meantime, the studies show that the gap in the wages of managers and qualified
workers was higher at the enterprises that have changed the number of employed. Thus, if the
number of employed was reduced by more than 20%, the differentiation in wages of managers
and qualified workers was equal 2.1. In the group of enterprises that have increased employ-
ment by more than 10%, the gap was equal 1.4. As far as the specialists are concerned, these
groups have behave in a different ways as well. The second group “value” specialists more
than the first one (see Table 14). Dynamics of the correlation of the wages of managers and
qualified workers also supports the thesis of two models of the inner labour policy, where one
is aimed at the increase of the managing unit, while decreasing the total number of employed,
and the other one is making stress on the increasing share of workers while increasing the total
number of employed.
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Table 14.
Correlation of the wages (including bonuses) of some of the professional groups, de-
pending on the changes of the number of employed in May, 1997. (Wage of the qualified
worker = 100%), in %
correlation of the wages at the enter-
prises
increased em-
ployment more
than  10%
reduced employ-
ment more than
20%
managers 137 211
specialists in administration 127 111
Middle level managers 192 161
Middle level specialists 111 101
non-qualified workers 62 53
Benefits, provided to the employees.
We understand benefits as different forms of address, money and quasi-money sup-
port, provided to the employees by the enterprise. These forms are not obligatory, as, for ex-
ample, State guarantees (annual vacation or paid sick-lists), and are not linked directly to the
results of the activities of the employees (as bonuses or payments from profit).
We have defined three groups. First — benefits on the regular and universally-
subsidirial basis that are available for all employees: (1) subsidies to cover transportation
costs; (2) subsidies to cover expenses on meals (can be of two types — either money, or cou-
pons for the factory mess); (3) subsidies to cover expenses on food products and other good,
purchased at the shops, owned by the enterprise.
The second group consists of support that has a regular basis, but is available only for
the specific categories of workers: (1) subsidies for those who live in the buildings that belong
to the ministry or enterprise, or, in some cases assistance in renting an apartment; (2) subsidies
to cover the expenses on nursery schools, or maintenance of such schools at the expense of the
enterprise; (3) additions to the pensions — available for the pensioners, both those who still
work at the enterprise, and those who’s left the enterprise.
Third group consists of the non-regular money payments: material support, partially
paid places in sanatoriums, resorts, etc.
Each specific enterprise has its own basket of benefits, but the analysis of the overall
data will make it possible to determine the most popular of them, i.e. those that are available
for the workers at most of the enterprises.
As the result of the analysis carried out, it was/was not determined a significant differ-
ence in ability to use the benefits between the management of the enterprise and industrial
workers and between employed full and short working day as well. Significant differences in
access and use of the benefits were found only in the category of temporarily employed work-
ers. That is why the further analysis of the data we carried out using only two types of work-
ers: main industrial workers, employed full day, and temporarily employed workers. The
summarised data of the frequency of distribution of different types of benefits for these cate-
gories of employed are shown in the Table 15.
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Table 15.
Types of benefits and their availability for the different categories of employees.
Types of benefits Industrial workers,
employed full working
day
Temporarily em-
ployed workers*
Regular benefits of the general character
transportation subsidies 26.4 10.2
Meals subsidies 38.0 23.8
Privileged price on industrial goods 8.2 6.7
Regular benefits for specific categories of workers
living benefits, subsidies 14.1 1.3
nursery schools subsidies 31.6 9.2
additions to pensions 8.2 3.5
Non-regular benefits
Material support 86.3 24.1
resorts, sanatoriums 42.7 13.3
health care 50.9 16.3
nonrecurrent payments at the moment of the
leave for pension
68.8 11.1
*Data is shown for the enterprises, where the share of the temporarily employed workers was
equal 63%.
As it cam be seen from the Table 15, most of the enterprises preferred to provide their
employees with the non-regular benefits, mainly material support (83,3%) and nonrecurrent
payments at the moment of the leave for pension (68.8%). It should be mentioned that all
benefits, gathered in this group appeared to be mostly popular. Probably, it could be explained
by the relatively small financial weight of these benefits, considering the total number of em-
ployed.
The second place by the frequency of distribution take the benefits, that are provided
usually to all employees on the regular basis. In this group could be distinguished such bene-
fits as meals subsidies (38.0%) and subsidies, covering transportation costs (26.4%). As a pe-
culiarity of these types of benefits, it should be mentioned that they are stable and financially
transparency. Usually, these very benefits may be easily checked as included in the financial
expenses of the enterprise, and as the additional income of the employees.
Benefits, provided to the specific categories of the employees appeared to be least
popular. Thus, subsidies to cover the expenses on the nursery school are available only at
31,6% of the enterprises, accommodation subsidies — 14.1%, and additions to pensions —
8.2%.
Level of availability of the benefits for the temporal workers is significantly lower.
Usually all types of benefits are 3-4 times less available for the temporal workers than for the
permanent workers. The least divergence is observed in the group of the regular benefits,
where the gap makes up 1.5-2.5 times. These differences in ability to use different types of
benefits can be explained by the general character of the regular payments, though even in this
case the discrimination of the temporal workers is obvious.
At the enterprises of different property forms the differentiation in provision of the
benefits is insignificant. The only worth mentioning aspect is the significant reduction of the
benefits for the employees of the State enterprises (more than 5 times), while at the enterprises
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of the other property forms this reduction was not more than 2.5-3.5 times. Probably, the rea-
son for that are some limitations on hire of the temporal workers for the State enterprises.
Among the branches of Industry, enterprises of the food processing and chemical industries
with the stable or increasing number of employed are leading by the number of benefits pro-
vided.
Social sphere of the enterprises.
Even not long ago the existence of the social sphere was supposed to indicate the
prosperity of the enterprise and it’s high status. Those were mainly big enterprises of the engi-
neering and chemical industries (most of them belonged to the Defence industry), as well as
the giants of the Soviet light industry, traditionally subsidised by the Centre. The social serv-
ices were provided to the workers free or at a very low price and were covered at the expense
of the income of the enterprise.
During the years of economic transformations the situation changed radically. Social
sphere, became a burden for the enterprise or even a threat for it’s existence. That’s why more
and more enterprises lately are trying to get rid of the social infrastructure, to transfer it to the
balance of municipal bodies or just to sell it to somebody else. During the period of 1994-
1995, 13.1% of the  enterprises got rid of the social objects. In 1996-97 — 29.6%. The trans-
fer of the social infrastructure under the jurisdiction of the municipal bodies was mostly active
in “depressed” Ivanovo region, where the enterprises were first to feel that burden, taking
away 28.7% of their income. In 1994-1995 18% of the enterprises of Ivanovo region got rid of
the objects of social sphere, and by 1997 just 30% of the enterprises kept the social infra-
structure. The situation is different in Nijegorodskii region (where the share of the Defence
industry is high in the industrial structure of the region), where even in 1997 61% of the en-
terprises kept fully or partially their social infrastructure. It should be mentioned that till 1995
most of these enterprises, being owned by the State, were not in a rush to get rid of the social
sphere, expecting the State support and State orders. Obviously, the hopes ran dry by 1996. To
testify to it, there is a sharp increase of the number of the enterprises that have transferred
their social infrastructure fully or partially under the jurisdiction of the municipal authorities
(43.3% in 1996-97). In the meantime, a big number of the enterprises of Nijegorodskii region
(40.3%) are planning further relief from the social sphere (40.3% against 20% in Ivanovo re-
gion).
The smoothest process of transfer of the social infrastructure can be observed at the
Moscow enterprises. Annually, 12-13% of them got rid of their social sphere.
If the ratio of the transfer of the social sphere will stay at the same level, then it may be
assumed that in 2-3 years only these enterprises will have social sphere, which Directors con-
sider it to be necessary (in 1997 there were 25% of such Directors in Moscow, 19% in Nije-
gorodskii region and 8% in Ivanovo).
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Labour demand model and estimation
 In the preliminary version of this paper we tried to create a labour demand model, us-
ing the data available, that covered the period of 1994-1997, and were presented in the an-
swers to the questions of the RLFS questionnaire. We should mention, that the labour demand
in that model was linked to the employment rate for the prior period, wage, capacities usage
level (%) and change (+ /-) of the production volume. Further analysis of the data for the prior
years, as well as the additional data received during processing of the questionnaires of 1997,
made us to reconsider our approach towards the model.
Though we tried to use the maximum possible number of enterprises in our estima-
tions, their number differed from 125 to 140, depending on the year. As the result, 103 enter-
prises (for which we had all the necessary data for all years of survey) were selected for the
final analysis5.
Among the functional forms used to analyse the labour demand in a transitional econ-
omy was, for example the following:
lnLt =a0 +a1lnLt-1+ a2lnQt +a3lnQt-1 + a4(w/c) t + a5(w/c) t-1+ e
This relationship was used in Korosi (1997) to analyse the employment at 600-700 export-
oriented Hungarian firms.
Having in mind the data availability in our survey, in our empirical model we sug-
gested that the level of employment during the current year should depend on the level of em-
ployment, production volume and the ratio of a share of payment for labour to a share of ma-
terial costs in the total production costs per previous year. Thus, we conducted calculations,
using the following model:
lnLt =a0 +a1lnLt-1+a2lnQt-1 + a3(w/c) t-1+ e
where:
L - number of employed as for June, 1st, of the corresponding year. Employed are to be un-
derstood as all workers of the enterprise (including permanent and temporal workers, those,
working full and reduced working day), except for the women on the maternity leave and
child care leave and employed at the objects of social sphere;
Q - annual production output;
w/c - Ratio of a share of payment for labour to a share of material costs in the total production
costs per previous year;
e — error
The estimation of the model was carried out in two ways - least squares method (OLS-
estimation) and 2-stage least squares method (2SLS-estimation)6. The results obtained are
shown in tables 2 and 37.
                                                
5 Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 4.
6 The following indicators were used as instrumental variables:
the volume of production funds (in fact — capital stock), ratio of the production volume to the production funds,
ratio of the number of employed to the production funds, level of usage of production capacities. Correlation of
the residials with the regressors is absent. The estimation of the heteroscedasticity was not carried out as this
function is absent in the SPSS software we were using.
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Table 2.
Dependence of the current employment volume (ln) on the indices of employment (ln),
production volume (ln) and ratio of a share of payment for labour to a share of material
costs in the total production costs per previous year. OLS estimation.
1994 1995 1996 1997
lnLt-1 0.8982
(39.31)***
0.8972
(40.67)***
0.9297
(37.30)***
0.8695
(30.34)***
lnQt-1 0.0459
(2.93)***
0.0774
(4.83)***
0.0681
(4.04)***
0.0971
(4.81)***
(w/c)t-1 7.6741E-04
(0.10)
-0.0102
(-0.98)
0.0032
(0.91)
0.0221
(0.53)
Constant 0.0931
(0.93)
-0.1446
(-1.62)
-0.3228
(-3.32)***
-0.2751
(-2.15)**
F 1470.40 2004.89 1604.04 1033.99
R2 Adj 0.9774 0.9833 0.9792 0.9681
Notes: 103 observations in each year
T-statistics in parenthesis (* - 10% level of significance, ** - 5% level of significance, *** -
1% level of significance)
Table 3.
Dependence of the current employment volume (ln) on the indices of employment (ln),
production volume (ln) and ratio of a share of payment for labour to a share of material
costs in the total production costs per previous year. Instrumental variables estimation.
1994 1995 1996 1997
lnLt-1 0.6640
(8.27)***
0.7436
(15.54)***
0.7098
(10.21)***
0.7306
(14.95)***
lnQt-1 0.2670
(2.78)***
0.2239
(5.37)***
0.2647
(4.67)***
0.2247
(5.59)***
(w/c)t-1 0.0511
(2.08)**
0.0419
(1.80)*
0.2339
(1.93)*
0.1167
(2.04)**
Constant -0.5990
(-2.19)**
-0.5447
(-3.36)***
-0.8613
(-3.97)***
-0.6733
(-3.68)***
F 462.26 1057.70 617.12 741.54
R2 Adj 0.9314 0.9688 0.9482 0.9561
Notes: 103 observations in each year
T-statistics in parenthesis (* - 10% level of significance, ** - 5% level of significance, *** -
1% level of significance)
                                                                                                                                                        
7 At first, we were planning to consider the influence of the branch and regional differences by means of use of
the corresponding fixed variables. But the effect of these factors turned out to be insignificant. The results of
estimation including the branch and regional fixed effects are given in Table 1 of the Appendix.
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Analysis of Tables 2 and 3 shows that, when using the least squares method, (w/c)t-1
variable is insignificant during the whole period of observation. More of that, the coefficient
of the production volume variable (Qt-1) is very small. But the analysis of the data, using the
instrumental variables method gives us different results. First, all the used variables appeared
to be significant (at least at the 10% level). Second, the influence of the lagged employment
level appeared to be lower then when we used the least squares method. The influence of the
production volume factor increased significantly.
The dynamics of these indices is changing in such a way, that the increase of the influ-
ence of the employment level corresponds to the decrease of the influence of the production
volume. Third, the (w/ct-1) indices started to influence the level of employment in 1996 and
1997. That means that the relative increase of the payment for labour could influence the em-
ployment in in the nearest future.
Table 4.
Descriptive statistics of the variables.
Variables        Average   St. Deviation  Min      Max      N
EMPLOYMENT93          846.15    1581.11         9     13679     103
EMPLOYMENT94          764.61    1517.88        18     13771     103
EMPLOYMENT95          709.93    1489.41        20     13754     103
EMPLOYMENT96          651.79    1401.31        21     13000     103
EMPLOYMENT97          566.36    1216.15        14     11080     103
LN(EMPLOYMENT)93        6.01       1.18      2.20      9.52     103
LN(EMPLOYMENT)94        5.92       1.13      2.89      9.53     103
LN(EMPLOYMENT)95        5.83       1.14      3.00      9.53     103
LN(EMPLOYMENT)96        5.72       1.16      3.04      9.47     103
LN(EMPLOYMENT)97        5.58       1.16      2.64      9.31     103
product.volume 93     44546.03  125669.95     59.40   1092795   103
product.volume 94     37474.26  112255.36    175.00   1115031   103
product.volume 95     32874.79  100611.83    150.00   1000000   103
product.volume 96     25581.97   56601.36    169.49    523728   103
LN(product.volume)93    9.31       1.74      4.08     13.90     103
LN(product.volume)94    9.35       1.62      5.16     13.92     103
LN(product.volume)95    9.14       1.70      5.01     13.82     103
LN(product.volume)96    8.95       1.72      5.13     13.17     103
w/c 93                   .55        .54       .02      2.85     103
w/c 94                   .59        .50       .03      2.33     103
w/c 95                   .57        .65       .03      4.88     103
w/c 96                   .55        .53       .04      2.50     103
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Appendix
Stages of the empirical work on the enterprise survey
The work on the Project was conducted during the period January-December, 1997. Several
main directions were followed.
I. Preparation and carrying out of the survey of 186 industrial enterprises in three regions
of Russia: Moscow, Ivanovskaya Oblast and Nizhegorodskaya Oblast.
The work done can be summarised as follows:
1) modification of the questionnaire by making changes and additions (January-
February, 1997). During that stage a new separate question on the total sales value during
1995 and 1996 in current prices was included. there was no such question in the questionnaire
of the previous years, but the information on sales was crucial for the construction of the
model;
2) choice of the regions and sample construction (March-April, 1997);
3) multiplying the questionnaire and accompanying materials: 200 copies of the part 1
(8 pages each), 200 copies of the part 2 (20 pages each), 180 letters for the enterprise man-
agement, 180 copies of the report on the results of the previous survey (April-May, 1997);
4) instructing groups, carrying out field works in the regions (end of May -- beginning
of June, 1997);
5) Field works (June, 1997);
6) Data processing, verification of the base metrics with the survey data of 1996, logi-
cal control (July, 1997);
7) Typing data (180 questionnaire X 500 variables + 90,000 variables) - July, 1997;
8) Cleaning the database (1st week of August, 1997).
II. Operations with the database of 1997.
Standard groupings by:
- number of employed, change of employment;
- wage and salary, bonus payments;
- share distribution;
- enterprise social sphere
were made.
III. Panel database formation. The panel consists of enterprises which were covered by the
survey during the last four years -- 1994-1997. Forming such a panel was absolutely necessary
for construction and analysis of the labour demand model.
IV. Construction of the model. Several stages of model construction must be outlined.
1. Development of a preliminary variant of the model using the 1996 data (January-
May, 1997).
2. Trying the model out using the data of previous surveys (April-May, 1997).
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3. Modifying the model taking into account the comments of EERC experts (second
half of July -- August, 1997).
4. Formation of the database covering the period 1994-1997 (2nd-3rd week of August,
1997).
5. Primary calculations on the basis of the model using the database formed (August,
1997)8.
V.  Preparation of the analytical materials (papers) on the following aspects:
- changes in professional structure of the internal labour market;
- labour surplus at the enterprises: tendencies and consequences;
- changes in the forms of hiring of employees at the privatised enterprises;
- social and economic consequences of the privatisation;
- role of TU during enterprise restructuring;
- training and retraining during employment restructuring;
- state of the “vulnerable” groups of employees (women, youth, disabled workers);
- benefits and social sphere of the enterprises.
                                                
8 The organisational part of this report demonstrates clearly that part of the expert comments could not be
possibly dealt with before August 1997, that is before final database panel was formed.
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Table 1.
Dependence of the current employment volume (ln) on the indices of employment (ln),
production volume (ln) and ratio of a share of payment for labour to a share of material
costs in the total production costs per previous year. Least squares method9.
1994 1995 1996 1997
lnLt-1 0.9079
(34.67)***
0.9067
(32.21)***
0.9394
(31.94)***
0.8553
(24.56)***
lnQt-1 0.0430
(2.44)**
0.0651
(3.20)***
0.0630
(3.15)***
0.1013
(4.22)***
(w/c)t-1 0.0011
(0.13)
-0.0126
(-1.22)
0.0027
(0.76)
0.0284
(0.61)
Constant 0.0596
(0.54)
-0.0745
(-0.79)
-0.3031
(-2.88)**
-0.2275
(-1.60)
Branches (engineering as the basis)
Food 0.0341
(0.63)
0.0053
(0.10)
0.0411
(0.77)
-0.0289
(-0.41)
Light -0.0034
(-0.64)
-0.0913
(-2.11)**
-0.0081
(-0.16)
-0.0835
(-1.31)
Chemical -0.0306
(-0.50)
-0.0728
(-1.42)
-0.0045
(-0.08)
-0.0527
(-0.73)
Wood processing 0.0691
(0.98)
-0.0487
(-0.82)
0.0127
(0.19)
-0.1208
(-1.41)
Construction materials 0.0151
(0.19)
-0.0736
(-1.11)
-0.1464
(-1.96)*
-0.0355
(-0.36)
Regions (Moscow as the basis)
Nijnii Novgorod -0.0040
(-0.10)
0.0384
(1.15)
-0.0549
(-1.42)
0.0513
(1.01)
Ivanovo -0.0411
(-0.74)
-0.0245
(-0.52)
-0.0645
(-1.19)
0.0682
(0.99)
F 421.12 625.16 486.96 302.74
R2 Adj 0.9763 0.9839 0.9794 0.9673
                                                
9 T-statistics is given in brackets; * - 10% level of significance, ** - 5% level of significance, *** - 1% level of
significance.
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